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Background: The National Organization for Healthcare Provision (EOPYY) originates from the recent reform in
Greek healthcare, aiming amidst economic predicament, at the rationalization of health expenditure and
reactivation of the pivotal role of Primary Health Care (PHC). Health funding (public/private) mix is examined,
alongside the role of pre-existing health insurance funds. The main pursuit of this paper is to evaluate whether
EOPYY has met its goals.
Methods: The article surveys for best practices in advanced health systems and similar sickness funds. The main
benchmarks focus on PHC provision and providers’ reimbursement. It then turns to an analysis of EOPYY, focusing on
specific questions and searching the relevant databases. It compares the best practice examples to the EOPYY
(alongside further developments set by new legislation in L 4238/14), revealing weaknesses relevant to non-integrated
PHC network, unbalanced manpower, non-gatekeeping, under-financing and other funding problems caused by the
current crisis. Finally, a new model of medical procedures cost accounting was tested in health centers.
Results: An alternative operation of EOPYY functioning primarily as an insurer whereas its proprietary units are
integrated with these of the NHS is proposed. The paper claims it is critical to revise the current induced demand
favorable reimbursement system, via per capita payments for physicians combined with extra pay-for-performance
payments, while cost accounting corroborates a prospective system for NHS’s and EOPYY’s units, under a combination
of global budgets and Ambulatory Patient Groups (APGs)
Conclusions: Self-critical points on the limitations of results due to lack of adequate data (not) given by EOPYY are
initially raised. Then the issue concerning the debate between ‘copying’ benchmarks and ‘a la cart’ selectively
adopting and adapting best practices from wider experience is discussed, with preference to the latter. The idea
of an ‘a la cart’ choice of international examples is proposed. The ‘results’ discussing EOPYY’s dual function and
induced-demand favorable reimbursement system are further critically examined. International experience shows
evidence of effective alternatives, such as per capita and pay-for-performance payments for practicing doctors as
well as per case reimbursement for health centers under global budget principles.
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Current challenging economic climate prompts many
governments in and beyond the European Union to
work towards increasing efficiency and curbing expend-
iture in health systems. The Greek health system is a
mixture of (a) public integrated, (b) public contract and
(c) public reimbursement models, comprising elements
from both the public and private sectors and incorporat-
ing principles of different organizational patterns. The
system is therefore financed by state budget, social in-
surance contributions and private payments. Taxation
contributes 29.1% of total health expenditure, while
health insurance accounts for 31.2%. It should be noted
that private expenditure amounts for a very high per-
centage of the mixed financial resources, and this pub-
lic/private mixture is a significant feature of the system.
In a little more detail, out-of-pocket payments account
for 37.6% of total health expenditure, whilst private in-
surance accounts for 2.1%, calling the social character of
the health system into question [1]. However, total (pub-
lic and private) health expenditure has reduced since
2010 financial crisis (from almost 10 to 8% of GDP).
Further to the long standing existence of numerous social
and health insurance funds, of compulsory participation,
with the 2011 health insurance reforms resulting to a uni-
fied central health fund (EOPYY: National Organization for
Healthcare Provision), the Greek Government attempted to
minimize the burden on the state budget of subsidizing
larger and troublesome funds by transferring funds from
these that are financially better off [2] to these that are in a
less favorable position. Although EOPYY’s establishment is
undoubtedly the most promising reform of the last decades
in Greek health insurance, its performance doesn’t seem to
have met the expectations of the Greek Government.
The organization is engaged in a vicious circle of defi-
cits, although declining from 2.5 billion euros in 2012 to
1.2 billion euros in 2013, which generally characterize
the domestic social insurance system [3].
Primary Health Care (PHC) is a key factor in contem-
porary health systems acting both as a point of first con-
tact and a gatekeeping mechanism. PHC in Greece was
short while ago provided by both NHS and EOPYY units
however a large number of self-employed health profes-
sionals still exist. More specifically, PHC relies on health
centers and private or public hospitals’ outpatient clinics,
assigned to the NHS; EOPYY’s polyclinics and medical
offices; and physicians, nurses, pharmacists, physiothera-
pists and other self-employed health professionals
contracted with the EOPYY. The current scheme allows
the free choice of provider but free choice of insurer is
prohibited. Structurally, Greek general practitioners
(GPs) are under-numbered (compared to specialists),
there are a few nurses per thousand of population, and
urban areas attract most providers and patients. As aresult, gatekeeping and family physician institutions do
not exist, letting patients prefer the option of using sec-
ondary care structures.
This paper puts forward a proposal for reforming the
structure of Greek PHC and reimbursement system for
PHC providers contracted with EOPYY, undertaken by a
research project conducted by a multidisciplinary team
of both academic staff and individuals during the period
November 2012 - July 2013 and overseen by the Special
Account for Research Grants of Democritus University
of Thrace.
Methods
The methodology includes a selective review of healthcare
purchasing and provision systems in developed western
countries, and an analysis of the current situation of the
Greek PHC and EOPYY, as to point out both best practices
(or indeed poor examples to be avoided) and problems/
shortcomings in the Greek case to be tackled. The study of
health systems highlights issues, such as organizational
structure, operation and coverage, and last but not least
financing and remuneration methods. This spectrum of
systems and funds includes the state centered Anglo-Saxon
(“Beveridge”) tax-based system providing universal access
and coverage; the continental (“Bismarck”) model financed
by social insurance; and corporate elements from the
private model [4]. A brief summary of some of the most
important findings that are taken into account in our
research follows in the next subsection "A selective over-
view of health systems", leaving subsection "Overview and
analysis of Greek Healthcare focusing upon the EOPYY
and PHC" for a more detailed examination of the Greek
case and "Cost accounting under APGs principles" for
setting a standard costing procedure.
a. A selective overview of health systems
We have chosen to focus upon eight different and well-
developed health systems.
Three of them are taxation-funded, universal and com-
pulsory: the British - or indeed English as minor devia-
tions exist in Scotland - that is considered an archetype
and now operates through contractual agreements be-
tween 151 commissioning healthcare organizations and
healthcare practices operated by GPs [5]; the Swedish
that is organized and managed on three levels: national,
regional and municipal and promotes equality in access
on the base of a relatively de-commodified (despite
current rationalization) provision of social and health
services as access to PHC is not free of charge, whereas
there are provisions for maximum cost per service
[6-10]; and the Spanish that operates upon the regional
structure of the country, with each region having a min-
istry of health, and strict separation alongside good co-
operation of (between) primary and special care, giving
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legal) migrants [11,12].
Five systems are insurance based, four of them com-
pulsory of which three are public (Germany [13,14],
Austria [15] and France [16-18]) administered by au-
tonomous insurance funds (Germany and Austria, with
Germany moving towards unification and centralization
through AOK since 2009), or a unified state fund
(France), alongside federal structures of the states
themselves (Germany, Austria) purchasing services
from private providers who in the case of PHC act as
gatekeepers too, and one (in the Netherlands) a com-
bination of public and private insurers (freely chosen by
citizens) and contracting with private providers who are
paid by a combination of per capita and per visit, while
co-payments do not exist [19-22]. Last, one system (the
US) is insurance based, but neither public nor compul-
sory, with insurers and providers being private (and
providers being paid either from insurers or out-of-
pocket), while government schemes for vulnerable
groups (elderly, poor, Indians, veterans etc.) such as
Medicare and Medicaid also exist. Also, because of the
adoption of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, primary
care and public health receive increased funding, while
quality and expenditures are addressed through a range
of measures. Case-mix methods are widely used, espe-
cially in Medicare, worth mentioning the Ambulatory
Payment Classifications (APCs) and the Ambulatory
Patient Groups (APGs) [23,24].
To recapitulate, examples can be drawn from eight
healthcare systems for financing and providing of health-
care and PHC in particular. On a more policy oriented
target, the potentials for cost reduction have to be
quickly realized by redefining the insurance packages
that can be provided from public funds as the level of
commitment and solidarity to be given by our society. A
new strategy that will fix health sector should be taken
into account. Integrated Practice Units (IPU), outcome
and cost evaluation, geographical patients’ needs, infor-
mation technology are the starting points [25].
b. Overview and analysis of Greek Healthcare focusing
upon the EOPYY and PHC
Evolution of healthcare provision in Greece follows the
country’s (turbulent up to 1974) social and political his-
tory with legislative tug-of-wars, drawbacks, expansions
and collapses, whereas the dominant feature was the ex-
istence of many occupation-based and state-supported
social and health insurance funds, usually compulsory,
but leaving ample room for the private sector. A turning
point was in 1983 the establishing of the Greek National
Health Service by L 1397/83, which clearly stated state
responsibility, and funding to government healthcare
services that were of equal access and free at the pointof delivery, whereas the pre-existing insurance funds
remained. It should be however noted that despite a
large number of existing funds purchasing health ser-
vices, by early 2010s we can refer to IKA for private sec-
tor salaried employees, OPAD for state employees,
OAEE for the self-employed and OGA for farmers and
people living in small population rural areas. It is esti-
mated these four combined covered approximately 90%
of the population. Establishment of EOPYY by L 3918/11
that was approved by Parliament on February 11th started
operating on 1st January 2012 as preparatory measures
were needed, is a significant step in the said evolutionary
process. This step was necessitated inter alia by the press-
ing fiscal, financial and of course funding constraints
caused crisis and memorandum and its implementation
overseen by the three lenders or else so called ‘Troika’.
Further steps were taken under the Law 4238/14 making
organisational and structural changes, such as the sep-
aration of the EOPYY (IKA) polyclinics from EOPYY
and their affiliation with the NHS health centers, under
Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), accompanied by
setting personnel issues (allegedly partly related to the
‘memorandum’ and expenditure cuts through putting
staff on probation before re-employing them under
new conditions), but not significantly altering funding
or accessibility. As this article wishes to focus on acces-
sibility and funding of services, the next pages will con-
tinue concentrating on EOPYY and the arrangements
of L 3918/11.
Returning to the main point of interest, it can therefore
be claimed that currently in a nutshell the Greek health
system is a mixture of three main components [26,1]:
1) A tax-based national health system (NHS) that is
responsible for public hospitals and health centres
in the rural areas (now in the urban areas too).
2) An extensive network of polyclinics belonging to
insurance funds (mainly IKA), financed by insurance
contributions paid by employees and employers.
These units are mainly located in urban areas,
covering more than 50% of the population. Their
control and management was recently extorted from
EOPYY and transferred to RHAs (unfortunately
reducing their utilisation).
3) A private insurance system (fairly small and mainly
consisting of supplementary insurance) and a
private delivery system, consisting of private
hospitals, diagnostic centres and private
physicians, most of which have contracts with
EOPYY (who in turn can not afford to finance all
now).
Examining EOPYY in more detail, it can be observed
that it runs its own healthcare delivery units in urban
Table 1 Co-insurance rates
Categories of goods and services Patient’s charges
Preventive medicine 0%
Laboratory tests 15%
Health consumable materials 25%
Costed medical procedures 20% or 45%
Physiotherapy 0% (annual ceiling)
Speech therapy 0% (monthly ceiling)
Psychotherapy 0% (monthly ceiling)
Additional care and therapeutics 25%
Nursing in foreign public or private hospitals 5% or 10%
Pharmaceuticals 0-25%
Source: EOPYY [28].
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about 25% remaining in rural areas. Actually, these units
previously belonged to IKA and they were transferred to
EOPYY as a key term of the merger.
Further to the analysis of the purchasers, the article is
now turning the overview’s focal point to the point of
the supply of PHC services. In rural areas (approxi-
mately 30% of the population) PHC is provided mainly
by the NHS health centres, whereas in urban areas (70%
of population) is mainly provided by the outpatient de-
partments of public/private hospitals, EOPYY’s units and
self-employed health professionals, whilst there is no in-
tegration of the different PHC services. Workforce is un-
balanced, with too many physicians (many specialists
and few GPs) and a lack of nurses, health visitors and
other health professionals. In Greece, GPs account for
5% of total physicians (EU average being 25%). Greece
has the largest number of physicians among the member
states of the OECD and almost twice the average of the
member states of the EU (3.3/1,000 inhabitants) with 6.1
physicians/1.000 inhabitants [27]. This absence of GPs
as a first point of contact to health services favors an un-
controlled provision of medical examinations and diag-
nostic tests, whereas contribution of these examinations
and tests to morbidity reduction or health status im-
provement is uncertain.
Regarding purchasing of services and remuneration
of providers, once (EOPYY) was established, compul-
sory health insurance turned into a peculiar monop-
sony, as it is the sole purchaser of health services
covering over 98% of the insured population, while
prior to L 4238/14 used to be a PHC provider at the
same time. This leaves little room for maneuver for
providers (who can find no many other potential buyers
of their services), and for other smaller insurers (who
are dwarfed once compared with the organization) thus
the use of the term monopsony. Due to the concurrent
existence of numerous public insurance funds that were
(each) contracting individually with providers, EOPYY’s
establishment is undoubtedly the most promising re-
form of the last decades in Greek health insurance.
However its performance in 2012–2013 doesn’t seem
to have met the expectations of Greek society, Greek
state as well as Troika yet. The organization is engaged
in a vicious circle of deficits that characterize the do-
mestic social insurance system in general [2], caused by
a multiple of reasons such as the pre-existing shortfalls
of the funds that were bequeathed to EOPYY, funding
problems due to the crisis (unemployment, undeclared
work, inability of employers or self-employed to pay
contributions), topped-up by unregulated expenses and
supplier induced demand. So far, EOPYY has just cre-
ated successive deficits enforced by the reasons set
briefly above.Regarding the reimbursement system, self-employed
professionals enjoy only fee-for-service payments, ex-
cluding physicians who earn additional income per
visit. Physicians are reimbursed for a maximum num-
ber of visits per month; nevertheless it is not enough
to constrict induced demand. On the other hand, phy-
sicians of the NHS and the EOPYY are salaried regard-
less their specialty. Another feature of the Greek
health insurance market is the growing patient’s
charges, which have either the form of fixed percent-
age rates on the total cost (see Table 1) or the form of
a flat co-payment of €5 per visit to health centers and
outpatient clinics.
Moreover, there are large geographical inequalities.
Lack of equity of access to healthcare has been long
described as a fundamental problem of Greek health-
care. However, equity demands redesigning PHC into
an integrated model. The integration of primary care
providers, the establishment of a multi-disciplinary
team and the legislation for the family physician insti-
tution seem to be essential for continuous and efficient
healthcare [29].
As mentioned in the introduction and now on set by
the relevant legislation (i.e. Law 4238/14) Primary Health
Care (PHC) is the level of a health system that provides
entry into the system itself for all new needs and prob-
lems, providing person-focused care over time [30]. PHC
is now well understood as the basis for rational health sys-
tems. The provision of PHC incorporates a set of attri-
butes and characteristics: “First-contact” care; Continuous
(ongoing) care; Coordinated care; Comprehensive care
[31]. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that there
is a large heterogeneity internationally and especially in
Europe regarding PHC both as providers and spectrum of
provision are under question. In most cases, the core of
PHC is the family physician [32].
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The costing process was tested in NHS health centers
and included three steps:
I. Encoding of APGs (‘OEPFYs’ in Greek). The most
ordinary incidents of health centers were grouped
into 15 categories that are homogeneous in terms of
patient’s condition and required medical procedure.
Evidently, each group is expected to include
incidents of similar cost.
The 15 categories mentioned above are:
1) Emergency incident management (e.g. childbirth,
acute myocardial infarction, acute chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease ‘COPD’
exacerbation): Diagnostic, therapeutic
interventions, prescription, referral, medical
evacuation, are all included.
2) Management of acute (not emergency) disease (e.g.
trauma fracture, respiratory infection, migraine
crisis): Diagnostic, therapeutic interventions,
prescription, referral, are all included.
3) Review of acute or emergency incident: Diagnostic,
therapeutic interventions, prescription, referral, are
all included.
4) Physical health assessment (e.g. health certificate,
first examination in a clinic for chronic diseases):
Routine laboratory test, advanced preventive,
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions are not
included.
5) Partial physical health – chronic diseases review (e.
g. constipation, osteoporosis, depression, glaucoma,
and other vision problems): Routine laboratory test,
advanced preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic
interventions are not included.
6) Regular health check-up (e.g. natal care, monitoring
infant and child development): Routine laboratory
test is not included.
7) Laboratory exams without clinical examination (the
same for categories 8–11 and 15).
8) Prescription (medicines and exams).
9) Diagnostic or therapeutic intervention (e.g. blood
pressure and glucose measurement, injection
therapy, wound care).
10) Advanced diagnostic or therapeutic intervention (e.
g. nevus removal, ultrasound).
11) Children and adults vaccination.
12) Primary prevention (e.g. tips for quitting smoking,
contraception, alcohol, diet, sexually transmissible
disease, accidents): Routine laboratory test is not
included.
13) Advanced preventive intervention (e.g. ‘Pap’ test)
without a total clinical examination.14) Special assistance and support (e.g. physiotherapy,
rehabilitation, psychotherapy, social support,
terminal care) by a physician or other healthcare
professional.
15) Addressing administrative issues (e.g. receiving
exam answers, taking referrals, correcting
prescriptions’ error).
II. Matching APGs with the ICPC-2 coding.
International Classification of Primary Care consists
of 17 chapters, each divided into 7 components
concerning process codes, symptoms and
complaints, infections, neoplasms, injuries,
congenital anomalies and other diagnoses [33-35].
III. Development of a cost sheet. This includes a) staff
classification in medical, nursing, administrative
and other staff; b) calculation of the standard unit
labor cost (per staff category) c) insight upon
contribution rate per category of incidents (per staff
category) and d) determination of other direct cost
(materials, drugs and examinations the prices of
which was mainly obtained from Health
Procurement Commission’s (EPY’s) Observatory, as
well as determination of indirect cost (overheads)
absorbed on a man-hours basis.
The costing process was completed in June 2013 in
the health centers of Vari (prefecture of Attica) and
Michaniona (prefecture of Thessaloniki) taking into ac-
count 79 patient incidents.
Results
A prime aim of the survey resulting in the current article
was associated with the upgrading of the gatekeeping
role of GPs, working as group practices. Specifically con-
cerning reimbursement of contracted first contact physi-
cians (GPs and family pediatricians) could be established
at the rate of at least €20 per capita (with a registered
population between 1,000 and 2,000). Additional pay-
ments can also be established as an incentive for the
simultaneous management of multiple health problems
in the same patient episode of care and the necessary
preventive medical activities (health education, manage-
ment of major risk factors, etc.). These additional pay-
ments imply a pay-for-performance scheme similar to
this applied by UNCAM (France) through CAPIs [18].
Additional, on EOPYY’s charge, payments can be
established in case of (i) screening (€5 per case/screen-
ing), (ii) covering elderly people over 65 (€5 per capita/
patient), (iii) chronically ill population care (€5 per
capita/patient), and (iv) home visits (€5 per visit, max-
imum 3 visits per year per each registered beneficiary).
Moreover, first contact physicians could receive a type of
overtime allowance for 24-hour services provision to
beneficiaries. Should such a system be established, a co-
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to specialists without a referral from a family physician
or pediatrician becomes essential. In other words, bene-
ficiaries could visit specialists without charge only after
referral by physicians of first contact. Returning our
focus upon contracted specialists and other profes-
sionals, they will continue to be reimbursed on a fee-
for-service basis, specifying visiting hours and/or a
higher upper ceiling of visits per month (up to 300
visits), but an adjustment to regional global budgets in-
spired from the Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse (General
Local Health Insurance Fund) (or else AOK) is neces-
sary in a system totally summing up to approximately
one billion euro. As a result specialists’ payments de-
pend not only on the volume of services they provide
but also on the global budget of each health region. An-
other high co-payment (about 30% of the reimbursable
cost) is needed for laboratory and radio diagnostic tests
or visits to health professionals without a referral from
a contracted physician. A same purpose but lower (20%
of the reimbursable cost) co-payment is charged in
Austria [15], however Greece faces significant problems
of the so called “induced demand”, mainly due to doc-
tors’ oversupply.
GPs of health centres, regional offices and EOPYY’s
polyclinics can maintain their fixed salary, but they will
also be able to sign contracts with EOPYY. These contracts
will ensure them a motive of €10 per capita over 1,000
people. Moreover, they are beneficiaries of additional pay-
ments like those of self-employed GPs. Structural andFigure 1 Flows of proposed Health Provision and Financing in Greeceadministrative changes set by Law 4238/2014 referring to
transfer of responsibility and authority to RHAs includ-
ing the setting and function of mobile health units, ad-
ministration of EOPYY, and mainly issues relating to staff
salaries, directly influence implementation of the said pro-
posals. However the underlying solutions suggested after
the method of benchmarking health systems in various
countries and setting them vis-à-vis problems of the
Greek system (viz. per capita and additional payments, sal-
aries and extra contracts etc.) remain as policy proposals
for an ameliorated and with more efficient expenditure
healthcare delivery system regardless of its form in Ad-
ministrative Law.
Taking into account the best practices from devel-
oped health systems and funds mentioned above vis-a-
vis the situation in Greece, our proposal is extended to
a new model of provision (Figure 1) whereby PHC pro-
viders are interconnected and funded by a mixture of
users’ charges and formal payments (as described above),
whilst EOPYY is the unique pool of state subsidies and
contributions intending for primary and secondary care
financing.
Moreover, Table 2 represents the proposed distribu-
tion of NHS PHC units and staff (hereinafter Rural
Health Centers) merged with EOPYY PHC units and
staff (hereinafter NHS Urban Health centres) according
to population and other criteria. In the same context,
Table 3 represents the proposed (re-)distribution of
self-employed physicians contracted with EOPYY in
order to create an intergraded PHC network and fade.














1st 90 270 270 1,350 1,430 1,000 4,320
2nd 60 120 120 600 630 450 1,920
3rd 45 120 120 600 630 440 1,910
4th 50 130 130 650 690 480 2,080
5th 55 140 140 700 740 515 2,235
6th 80 170 170 850 900 630 2,720
7th 20 50 50 250 280 185 815
Total 400 1,000 1,000 5,000 5,300 3,700 16,000
aAllocation to health regions on a population basis catchment, bamong them 1000 pediatricians & more GPs.
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either signing new or breaking existing contracts. It’s
also obvious that GPs and pediatricians should spear-
head the reformed provision model.
Continuing on the argument set above, and given the
economic predicament and the immediate need to stop
the regressive and ultimately ineffective and inefficient
funding, a necessary and urgent reform is the transition
to an alternative system of both urban and rural health
centers’ reimbursement. This alternative system should
be based on APGs. The costing of the so called OEP-
FYs, as presented on Table 4, suggests an average cost
20.89 euros per incident. The highest cost was noted in
the category of direct cost (euro 12.67), and especially
that of laboratory tests (euro 8.29). It is therefore obvi-
ous that in all APGs recorded direct cost performs the
main contribution to the total cost per incident (by
60.64%) coupled by direct labor cost (31.36%). Indirect
cost in its turn seems to occupy only 8% of the total.
The contribution of highly expensive laboratory tests
(approximately 65% of direct cost) is primarily signifi-
cant. It is not surprising therefore, that the patientTable 3 Proposed distribution of contracted with EOPYY phys
Specialty/Health regionsa 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
GPs 280 124 180 74 124
Pathologists (internal medicine) 336 149 216 89 149
Cardiologists 224 99 144 59 99
Pediatricians 280 124 180 74 124
Obstetricians/gynecologists 168 74 108 44 74
Orthopedicians 112 50 72 30 50
Other physicians (pathologists) 420 186 270 111 186
Other physicians (surgeons) 140 62 90 37 62
Total 1,960 868 1,260 518 868
Per 1,000 population 0.64
aAllocation to health regions mainly on a catchment population basis.
b“+”: new contracts “-”: breaking existing contracts.incidents, which usually include laboratory tests (see 4,
5 & 7 category), are the APGs with the highest cost.
Finally, the proposed types of reimbursement are re-
lated to the (minimum) global (at least) budget for all
categories of PHC providers (Table 5), regarding the re-
sults of each health unit, sorted by categories of cases
(patients). Indispensable condition for the patient classi-
fication into APGs is the existence of a developed system
at the base of International Classification of Diseases/
International Classification of Primary Care (ICD-10/
ICPC-2) and Current Procedural Terminology (CPT-4),
as well as the necessary data extraction from an exten-
sive database. However, the availability of such a data-
base is extremely limited because of the absence of
electronic patient records, and of updated and reliable
healthcare billing system. As hinted above, the proposed
reimbursement method constitutes a conjunction be-
tween German global budgets and US Medicare case-
mix models.
Benchmarking other health systems has resulted to
proposals for restructuring and setting new schemes of
providers’ remuneration by EOPYY, also taking intoicians
6th 7th Total (proposal) Total (current) Deviationb
163 55 1,000 (14.3%) 420 (7.7%) +580
195 66 1,200 (17.1%) 1,246 (22.7%) −46
131 44 800 (11.4%) 842 (15.3%) −42
163 55 1,000 (14.3%) 206 (3.8%) +794
99 33 600 (8.6%) 569 (10.4%) +31
64 22 400 (5.7%) 383 (7.0%) +17
245 82 1,500 (21.4%) 1,650 (30.1%) −150
82 27 500 (7.1%) 170 (3.1%) +330
1,142 384 7,000 (100.0%) 5,486 (100.0%) +1,514
0.50 +0.14
Table 4 Mean average per APGs in the Greek NHS Primary Health Care units




















Tests (3) = (3.1)
+ (3.2) + (3.3)
Indirect cost/
Overheads (4)
1 9 10.3114 1.1302 1.1665 2.2967 2.0544 4.7333 0.0000 6.7878 2.4044 21.8003
2 10 4.5590 1.5738 0.6288 2.2026 0.1760 2.5000 0.0000 2.6760 1.1949 10.6325
3 5 3.2576 0.9072 0.0245 0.9317 0.0000 2.5700 0.0000 2.5700 1.0062 7.7654
4 6 5.4293 0.0000 0.0107 0.0107 33.3450 6.7500 0.0000 40.0950 1.4651 47.0001
5 9 6.3432 0.3161 0.0071 0.3233 23.8467 2.3278 0.0000 26.1744 1.5633 34.4042
6 6 6.5905 2.4017 0.0557 2.4573 0.7733 0.0000 13.0983 13.8717 1.7269 24.6463
7 6 18.9890 0.0000 3.7333 3.7333 32.5283 0.0000 0.0000 32.5283 4.2622 59.5128
8 3 3.5489 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0377 4.5866
9 6 1.8398 0.0000 0.3246 0.3246 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7279 2.8923
10 3 8.7933 0.2746 2.6278 2.9023 0.0000 1.3500 0.0000 1.3500 1.8850 14.9306
11 4 3.6526 0.0000 0.2089 0.2089 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1925 5.0540
12 4 7.2376 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.0293 9.2668
13 3 4.3651 0.0947 7.4067 7.5013 6.6600 0.0000 0.0000 6.6600 1.4033 19.9297
14 1 3.7879 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.2671 5.0550
15 4 2.8003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8092 3.6096
Total (weighted
average)
79 6.5510 0.6178 0.9197 1.5375 8.2877 1.8475 0.9948 11.1300 1.6728 20.8914
% of total 31.36% 2.96% 4.40% 7.36% 39.67% 8.84% 4.76% 53.28% 8.01% 100.00%
Median 4.8701 0.0000 0.0160 0.1747 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.3220 11.5829
Minimum 1.1364 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6183 2.1894




















Table 5 PHC Global Budget of EOPYY per region and category of contracted group of providers (million Euros – at
least)
Health regions
Provider 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th Total
Health centers & regional offices 20 35 25 25 35 45 15 200
EOPYY’s units 85 15 30 30 35 40 15 250
Contracted GPs 30 10 10 10 15 20 5 100
Contracted specialists 50 15 15 15 20 30 5 150
Diagnostic laboratories 69 20 35 35 36 37 18 250
Others 16 5 5 5 8 9 2 50
Total 270 100 120 120 149 181 60 1,000
Catchment population (in millions) 3.00 1.05 1.30 1.30 1.60 1.90 0.65 10.80
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presenting difficulties faced during our survey follows
in next section Discussion.Discussion
Any self-critical discussion of proposals should commence
with limitations encountered during survey and then turn
to an overall approach to question of how to set policy
proposals.a. Limitations
A key hindrance to the survey presented was the failure
from the official agency of the EOPYY to provide us with
the necessary and available information and data. This
lack of the necessary data of our research has prompted
us to present annual estimates of medical visits and
diagnostic tests and their cost.
Thus, the total medical visits and diagnostic tests per
annum have been estimated to 50 million visits along-
side 50 million tests, with a total cost of 650 million
euro for the medical visits and 250 million euros for the
diagnostic tests (100 million remaining for other health
professionals or/and for corrections to the above). Fur-
thermore, the average examination cost of each of the
total 15 APGs categories was calculated and multiplied
by the estimated number of tests for each group of pro-
viders (health centres, outpatient departments of NHS
hospitals, EOPYY polyclinics and affiliated physicians
with EOPYY) as to assist in cross checking and to in-
form us over cost estimates by provider.
Some additional limitations of the study were the
fact that the labour-hours required for each incident
were recorded through personal interviews with em-
ployees of the two main health centres, mainly with
physicians. The fluctuation of the relative cost, can be
attributed to the variety of (the same active substance)
medicines that are used by the health centres, and to
the fact that the indirect cost varies among healthcentres, despite salaries and medicine prices being cen-
trally controlled.
Additionally legislative changes occurred during the
final stages of writing this paper (L4238) have set a new
frame, which however does not alter much the key ideas
concerning accessibility and funding as the said Law re-
lates rather to administration and structure.
b. The setting of policy proposals
Health systems have to learn and benefit from each
other via adopting and adapting methods and practices
in financing, delivering and remunerating healthcare ser-
vices, not to mention patients’ flow between primary
and secondary (or indeed tertiary) healthcare services.
All four depend upon decisions, choices and habits of
the past, alongside social practices and culture relating
to healthcare and physician-patient or even physician-
society inter-connecting bonds and relations for that
matter. This is therefore why instead of a system of
copying and almost automatic implementation, a process
of selective adoption and of critical, flexible and suitable
adaptation is overall chosen and suggested, as well as
followed. In short our proposals related to the better-
ment of the Greek system, are based upon selective
adoption and critically appraised adaptation. Redesigning
PHC should be led to improve values in order to meet
patients’ needs towards groups of patients and team-
based professionals and services [36]. Payments would
be modified to succeed an effective relation between
them and third party payer, under productivity and qual-
ity standards. This is what our study tried indicatively to
solve in Greece.
Taking into account the restrictions mentioned above
and the future abolition of them, we hope to lay the
foundations for more detailed Greek APGs (OEPFY)
aiming at modernizing the financing (reimbursement)
system of units of PHC. Our proposal is to enhance the
further costing per individual visit-incident, based on the
APGs, combined by the matching of the ICPC-2 coding.
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on conclusions that examines how Greek healthcare
provision can benefit -using international benchmarks-
within a restrictive financial and fiscal framework and
environment.
Conclusions
Greek healthcare provision (and moreover primary
healthcare provision) can benefit by an “a’ la cart” pick-
ing up of solutions internationally implemented and
their subsequent adaptation to the now existing na-
tional system taking current crisis into account. Such
an approach can easily commence with ‘negative selec-
tion’ or else exclusion of the American and Dutch sys-
tems as they rely too much upon private insurance and
provision (with the American currently trying to use
the Dutch as an example for its expansion). Turning to
what can be used as examples in organization structure,
the English, Swedish and Spanish systems of regional
administration can be followed (excluding the Swedish
idea of regional self funding as Greece has not such an
experience in regional taxation on the one hand, and
has important differences in wealth and per capita
wealth and income between regions on the other). Such
an administrative structure can be followed and indeed
assist a better positioning of services by overlooking
staffing of Health Centers, giving motives to physicians
and other personnel (nursing staff, auxiliaries) as to
reduce patient overcrowding at urban areas (mainly
regional hospitals, and predominantly Athens and
Thessaloniki). This latter strengthening of services at
the localities can lead to stronger ‘gatekeeping’ by PHC
practitioners, and thus ultimately assist in overall cost
reduction. Adopting the German idea of fee paying for
secondary care if no referral from primary care practi-
tioner or service is presented, but adapting it to a lower
level e.g. 5 instead of 10 euro can also assist such a
goal. In this sense, a contract can be drawn (and of-
fered) to PHC group practitioners/physicians of first in-
stance requiring compulsory coverage of a basic range
of medical services (coupled by laboratory assistance
and ability for secondary care referrals) towards to spe-
cific group of patients.
On the other hand, the recently unified fund (EOPYY)
could be primarily a sole purchaser of services setting by
contracts the rules of the game for providers and asses-
sing their performance with the ability to strike of its
register unsatisfactory ones and attract promising indi-
viduals. Last but not least, EOPYY funding can be as
currently drawn from a combination of national insur-
ance contributions and general budget assistance (direct,
property and indirect taxes), as well as EOPYY manage-
ment should be taken more attention to be more inde-
pendent and effective.Greek PHC needs over a billion Euro (public or/and
social insurance money) in order to achieve universal
coverage, taken into account the private money too. It is
enormously difficult to ensure this amount especially
under the ongoing crisis. Our core approach includes
saving financial resources wasted on induced demand prac-
tices, unnecessary and irrationally priced care. EOPYY
should distribute this money geographically (global budget)
per service contracted (NHS and Private GPs, specialists
and others). Our research covered this proposal and more
over units’ and physicians’ remuneration. This could be set
upon a multiple of choices ranging from salary for National
Health Service Health Centers (and EOPYY transferred to
NHS) staff, plus incentives proposed, and going on the per
capita payments (following a combination of the English
workload weighted system and the German regional nego-
tiations system) for self-employed GPs, and fee for service
(coupled by Ambulatory Patients Groups cost estimate) for
specialists, on a Greek but rational way.
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